Abstract-Currently, in most attribute-based cryptosystem, the central authority that distributes private keys for attributes assigned to the user must be trusted unconditionally otherwise the systems will soon be collapsed. To solve the problem we propose a new attribute-based threshold signature scheme without a trusted central authority. When the number of user's attributes reaches the threshold he can sign validly. Additionally, the central authority can be distrusted. We prove that the scheme is existentially unforgeable under selective attributes and adaptive chosen-message attack and is secure against collusion attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to simplify the key management procedures of the certificate-based public key infrastructures, in 1984 Shamir [1] introduced the concept of identity-based cryptosystem whose public key is an arbitrary string such as E-mail address, ID, IP address, and so on. Attributebased encryption (ABE) is developed from the identitybased encryption (IBE) [2] , the identity of a user is not a unique string but a set of descriptive attributes. In such a system a party will wish to encrypt a document to all users that have a certain set of attributes. For example, in a computer science department of a university, the header might want to encrypt a document to the identity {professor, doctor, academic pacemaker}, any user who has an identity that contains all of these attributes could decrypt the document. Goyal etc. [3] presented a scheme for fine grained access control of encrypted data that each private key represents a formula describing which sets of attributes must appear on the ciphertext in order for this user to decrypt. The advantage of Attribute-based encryption is that a variety of cryptographic operation and dialogue can be easily done with the partial attributes of user instead of the exact identity of user. Attributebased cryptography acts more flexible and has a much wider range of applications compared with Identity-based cryptography in many situations.
Attribute-based signature (ABS) has also been greatly developed [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , publisher of a signature can profess that the signature is associated with a specific set of attributes or access structure [3] , and the verifier can confirm whether the signature is signed by the owner with the corresponding attributes or access structure. ABE is the development of IBE, similarly, ABS is the development of Identity-based signature (IBS), moreover, ABS is based on the identity-based threshold signature. The threshold of ABS is d which is the number of the predictive specific set of attributes in the system .As showed in [9] , Secret sharing schemes were first introduced by Shamir [13] .In identity-based ( , ) d n threshold signature systems the secret is shared with multiple users n , and d users or more could recover the secret and commonly generate the threshold signature with his own secret share respectively,while less than d users could not gain any information about the secret. Threshold signature is used to ensure the security of longterm and effective secret and solve the problem of concentration of power through lagrange polynomial interpolation. In the attribute-based threshold scheme proposed by Shahandashti etc. [4] , when the intersection between the signer's attributes and the verifier's attributes is d or more, the verifier can verify whether the signature is generated by the publisher of a signature .This scheme is a verifier-based threshold signature, however, in the paper the proposal is based on attributes of user threshold signature scheme whose master private key is shared with attributes of user through Lagrange interpolation, and when the number of user's attributes reaches the threshold d the user can sign validly.
A. Our Contribution
There is an inherent disadvantage in identity-based systems : the problem of private key escrow [14] [15] , that is, the trusted Private Key Generator(PKG) has all the user's private key and can easily impersonate any user at any time without being detected. It implies that the PKG must be trusted unconditionally otherwise the systems will soon be collapsed. However, it would be difficult to assume the existence of a trusted party in an ad hoc network, where the communication parties are changing frequently. Similarly, ABS is also facing this problem, there is a trusted central authority (CA) [6] [10] who distributes private key for attributes assigned to the user. So, CA can easily forge the signature of any user at any time without being detected. To solve this problem the attribute-based threshold signature without a trusted central authority is presented in this paper where the central authority can be corrupt and can not forge signature of any user. We prove that our scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack and reduce the security of our scheme to computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. In addition, the scheme can prevent collusion attack. To our best knowledge, there is no attribute-based threshold signature without a trusted central authority that has been formally presented before.
B. Orgnization
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section Ⅱ we describe some preliminaries such as bilinear pairings, computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and lagrange interpolation. In Section Ⅲ we give our security definition including syntax of a threshold ABS and security model. In Section Ⅳ we present the construction of our threshold ABS scheme without a trusted central authority .The following is the proof of security in Section Ⅴ . In Section Ⅵ we discuss the performance of our scheme compared with other ABS schemes. Finally , we conclude in Section Ⅶ.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Pairings
Let 1 2 , G G be cyclic groups of prime order p , and let g be a generator in 1 G . A bilinear pairing is a map G .
C. Lagrange Interpolation
Shamir [7] uses polynomial interpolation to solve the problem of share of the secret .Let ( )
we can uniquely compute ( ) q x for any
We define the Lagrange coefficient:
where S is a set composed of any d different points
x q x ,and
In a ( , ) d n threshold signature systems , if there is
x q x in S , we couldn't get any information about the polynomial ( ) q x .
III. ATTRIBUTE-BASED SIGNATURE
In this section, we show the definition and security model of attribute-based signature. Then, we propose a construction.
A. Syntax
In ABS, there are two entities [9] : a central attribute authority (CA) and users. The central authority is in charge of the issue of attribute private key to users requesting them. In more details, the definition of ABS is described below.
In a generic attribute-based signature scheme there are four algorithms, namely, setup algorithm Setup, private key extraction algorithm Extract, signing algorithm Sign, and verification algorithm Verify. We use { } Verify The verification algorithm is a deterministic algorithm and is run by the verifier that takes as input the public parameters MPK , a message signature pair ( , ) m σ and the set for signature S . The verifier checks if σ is a valid signature. If it is valid, the verifier outputs valid and accepts. Otherwise, the verifier outputs invalid and rejects.
B. Security Model
We now discuss the security model of a threshold ABS scheme. We define a weaker notion of security that is selective-set model [3] for proving the security of the attribute based under chosen message attack. This model can be seen as analogous to the selective-ID model [17] [28] with the exception that the adversary is only allowed to query for secret keys for attributes which have less than d with the target attributes.
In this paper we consider a weaker notion of security which is selective unforgeability against chosen message and attribute set attacks. More precisely, we define the following game between a challenger C and the adversary F. The game has four distinct phases:
Initiation Phase The adversary F declares the set of attributes * ω that he wishes to be challenged upon.
Setup Phase
The challenger C chooses a sufficiently large security parameter 1 l and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the adversary the resulting system parameters MPK and keeps the master key MSK to itself.
Query Phase There are three oracles provided to the adversary for query for the following:
-Private Key Extraction Oracle: F can perform a polynomial bounded number of private key queries for any attribute set γ as long as Extract to obtain the private key SK of the setγ , and then running Sign to obtain a signatureσ that is forwarded to the adversary.
-Random Oracle: Since the security in the paper is proved in the random oracle model, another oracle should also be provided to the adversary additionally. F can make at most Hueries to H − oracle. Given m , the challenger output a random value to the adversary.
Forgery m ω .
The advantage of an adversary that it wins in the above game is defined to be Pr[
If no polynomial adversary has a considerable advantage in the above game, we say that the t-ABS scheme is selectively unforgeable against chosen message and attribute set attacks, or SUF-CMAA-secure for short.
Definition1. An adversary F is said to be a ( , , , , ) 
IV. OUR ATTRIBUTE-BASED SIGNATURE CONSTRUCTION
In our construction, the signer could generate a signature with some of its attributes. And, in our system a predefined number d will be given before setup algorithm and d is the threshold. And, the signer could generate a signature with its d attributes. In addition, we present the construction in large universe and use { } 
C. Sign Algorithm
Suppose that the message to be signed is m and the signer's attributes set for signature is S .Using private key SK , the signer randomly chooses integer 
V. SECURITY PROOFS
A. Correctness
We show that our scheme is correct. If Proof We prove the scheme with reduction of the theory of provable security. Suppose that an adversary F has an advantage ε in attacking the scheme, we can build an algorithm B that uses F to solve the CDH problem.
The algorithm B will be given a group 1 G , a generator Then, we implicitly have , , , ,... , , Next we compute the private key SK for \ ' i γ ∈ Γ as follows: 
C. Security against Collusion Attacks
The definition of collusion attack is that multiple users combine their keys to form identities that are a combination of their attributes. Then, the colluders are then able to sign that none of them individually were able to sign. The construction in the paper can resist collusion attacks like other attribute-based schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .because the private key components are tied to random polynomials that CA selects for different users, each user's attributes keys are generated using different random share of a secret, so keys generated for different users cannot be combined.
D. Security against the Forgery of the Central Authority
In [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] , there is a critical disadvantage that the central authority knows the private keys of all users, so he is able to impersonate any user to sign a document or decrypt an encrypted message. If the central authority is corrupted the system will soon be collapsed. This is called the problem of private key escrow that exists in ID-based systems and attribute-based systems. In this paper we proposed a threshold signature scheme without trusted CA. To prevent CA from forging signature of a user, CA has master key 1 y of the system and the user has his long-time private key 2 y , the master key of CA and the private key of the user are shared by the attributes of the user, so the private keys of the attributes are determined by CA and the user. Thus, CA cannot forge signature of the user without knowing 2 y .
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Compared with other attributed-based signature schemes [5] [9] ,our proposal has two advantages: one is that the signer only needs to publish part of his attributes as the set of signature such that , S S d ω ⊆ = instead of the whole set of attributes ω .So, the verifier is only aware of threshold d and the set of signature, and cannot precisely knows all attributes owned by the signer .Thus, the privacy of the signer is well protected. Another is that there are d private keys for attributes in S than in ω to be generated in the key generation algorithm. If there is a great deal of attributes inω , the scheme proposed in this paper can greatly improve in efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
An attribute-based threshold signature scheme without a trusted central authority is firstly put forward in this paper whose threshold is based on attributes of signature for the user than those of intersection between the user's and the verifier's. When the user has more than d attributes, he can effectively sign .Additionally, the problem of private key escrow is well solved, and so this scheme increases its applicability. Additionally, our scheme is proved existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen message attack and secure against collusion attack.
